Train Accident Newsroom

The Derailment Of A Canadian Pacific Railway Freight Train

This matter stems from the derailment of a Canadian Pacific Railway freight train that occurred near Minot, North Dakota, on January 18, 2002. Several damaged tanker cars released anhydrous ammonia into the air. There is no dispute that anhydrous ammonia can be dangerous in high concentrations. The dosage level of exposure is the determinative factor in the assessment of causation and injury. On January 25, 2002, the Plaintiffs filed suit on behalf of themselves and a class of similarly situated persons, claiming that the defendant, Canadian Pacific Railway, (hereinafter referred to as “CPR”) was responsible for the personal injuries and property damage suffered because of the trail derailment.         

I.Injury Class: A Rule 23(b)(3) class consisting of all persons who were in the anhydrous ammonia cloud in and around the city of Minot, North Dakota, and who were adversely affected by the release of the hazardous chemical on January 18, 2002, and who have sustained property damages, property value diminution, personal injuries, emotional, mental or economic damages, or inconvenience as a result of the derailment and hazardous chemical release.  

II.Medical Monitoring Class: A Rule 23(b)(2) class consisting of all persons who were in the anhydrous ammonia cloud in and around the city of Minot, North Dakota, on January 18, 2002.  

II.       LEGAL DISCUSSION

            A.        EVIDENTIARY HEARING

 CPR has requested an evidentiary hearing on the matter of class certification. The Plaintiffs’ oppose the request for an evidentiary hearing.

The propriety of a class action status can seldom be determined on the basis of the pleadings alone. . . . The District Court must have before it “sufficient material to determine the nature of the allegations, and rule on compliance with the Rule’s requirements . . . .” Securing this material does not always require a formal evidentiary hearing. . . . Where, however, the pleadings themselves do not conclusively show whether the Rule 23 requirements are met, the parties must be afforded the opportunity to discover and present documentary evidence on the issue.

Int’l Woodworkers of America v. Georgia-Pacific Corp., 568 F.2d 64, 67 (8th Cir. 1977) (quoting Walker v. World Tire Corp., 563 F.2d 918, 921 (8th Cir. 1977)). In support of their respective positions, both parties have provided the Court with a plethora of exhibits comprising hundreds of pages, all of which the Court has carefully reviewed. The Court is hard-pressed to imagine what additional relevant evidence would be presented at an evidentiary hearing. The Court finds the exhibits submitted by the parties are “sufficient material” to determine whether the Plaintiffs’ have met the requirements of Rule 23.

Included in their request for an evidentiary hearing is CPR’s assertion that the Plaintiffs’ experts’ opinions are flawed, and thus, the Plaintiffs’ assertions supporting their motion for class certification are invalid. Not surprisingly, CPR’s experts contend that the Plaintiffs’ experts’ opinions are incorrect. The Plaintiffs respond by contending it is inappropriate to resolve disputes between experts’ opinions at the class certification stage. 
The Plaintiffs have offered the opinions of Dr. James G. Dahlgren, a board certified internist and an assistant clinical professor of medicine at University of California Los Angeles; Dr. C.B. Scrignar, a physician specializing in the field of psychiatry, behavior therapy, stress and anxiety, posttraumatic stress disorder, and forensic psychiatry; Dr. Neal A. Sher, a board certified ophthalmologist; Dr. Vasilis M. Fthenakis, a chemical engineer with a Ph.D. in fluid dynamics and atmospheric science; and Dr. William J. Nassetta a board certified internist with a M.P.H. and a speciality in environmental health. The Defendants have offered the opinions of Dr. Thomas F. Mulrooney, a clinical associate professor of medicine at the University of Minnesota Medical School; Dr. Steven Carter, a licensed psychologist with training and clinical experience treating posttraumatice stress disorder, major depressive disorder, generalized anxiety disorder, bipolar disorder, substance abuse disorder, and traumatic brain disorder; and Dr. Alan Weingarden, a licensed physician familiar with the symptoms and physical manifestations of anhydrous ammonia exposure.

The Eighth Circuit has recently addressed the issue of using experts’ opinions at the class certification stage:

Appellants argue on appeal that the district court improperly resolved disputes between the parties’ experts that go to the merits of the case. We have stated that in ruling on class certification, a court may be required to resolve disputes concerning the factual setting of the case. This extends to the resolution of expert disputes concerning the import of evidence concerning the factual setting – such as economic evidence as to business operations or market transactions. While the district court’s language may have been overbroad in places, we believe the district court’s findings as to the experts’ dispute were properly limited to whether, if appellants’ basic allegations were true, common evidence could suffice, given the factual setting of the case, to show classwide injury.

Blades v. Monsanto Co., No. 03-3993, 2005 WL 517009, *10 (8th Cir. March 7, 2005). The district court found it was appropriate to consider all evidence at the class certification stage. Id. at *6. Accordingly, the district court “considered all expert testimony offered by both sides in support of or in opposition to class certification” and “afforded that testimony such weight as . . . deemed appropriate.” Id. Other district courts within the Eighth Circuit have reached similar conclusions. See In re St. Jude Medical, Inc. Silzone Heart Valves Products Liability Litig., No. MDL 01-1396 JRTFLN, 2003 WL 1589527 (D. Minn. March 27, 2003) (holding a full review of expert testimony pursuant to Daubert was inappropriate at the class certification stage, but nevertheless carefully scrutinizing the medical evidence to determine whether it supported class certification); In re Monosodium Glutamate Antitrust Litig., 205 F.R.D. 229, 234 (D. Minn. June 8, 2001) (holding that a court cannot, and should not, engage in a Daubert analysis at the class certification stage); Midwestern Machinery v. Northwest Airlines, 211 F.R.D. 562, 565 (D. Minn. Jan. 18, 2001) (holding that the application of the Daubert test is somewhat limited at the class certification stage and that a party and its experts should not be expected to have fully evaluated all data at the preliminary stage of class certification); see also Steven Glickstein, Melissa C. Morrow, Julie K. duPont, & Kaye Scholer LLP, Does Daubert Apply to Class Certification Hearings?, 695 P.L.I. Litig. 423 (2003).

The Court finds the district court’s analysis in In re Visa Check/MasterMoney Antitrust Litig., 192 F.R.D. 68, 77 (E.D. N.Y. Feb. 22, 2000), to be persuasive:

It cannot be that a court could certify a class . . . on the basis of an expert opinion so flawed that it is inadmissible as a matter of law. Although there is a role for a Daubert test here, it is a limited one, tailored to the purpose for which the expert opinion is offered. The question is not, therefore, whether a jury at trial should be permitted to rely on [the expert witness’s] report to find facts as to liability, but rather whether I may utilize it in deciding whether the requisites of Rule 23 have been met.

The Court finds it unnecessary to hold an evidentiary hearing on the motion for class certification. The Court has carefully reviewed the expert opinions offered by both parties and will give the expert opinions such weight as deemed appropriate in determining whether class certification is warranted. The Defendants’ Motion for an Evidentiary Hearing is denied.