Train Accident Newsroom

Committe On Transportation And Infrastructure Of Railroads

The NTSB has been investigating train collisions and over-speed rail accidents for over 35 years and issued our first safety recommendation in 1969 following a head-on collision between 2 Penn Central commuter passenger trains in Darien, Connecticut. The Safety Board recommended that the Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) “study the feasibility of requiring a form of Automatic Train Control at points where passenger trains are required to meet other trains” (R-70-003).

Since 1970, the Safety Board has issued numerous safety recommendations related to positive train separation. Our most recent safety recommendation was issued in 2001, following the investigation of a collision involving three Conrail freight trains in Bryan, Ohio. The trains were operating in fog, when a faster moving train missed a stop and proceed signal and hit the rear-end of a train that had slowed because of poor visibility. A third train, coming from the opposite direction, struck the two derailed trains. The Safety Board concluded that a fully implemented Positive Train Control system would have prevented the collision and recommended that the FRA “facilitate actions necessary for the development and implementation of positive train control systems that include collision avoidance, and require implementation of positive train control systems on main line tracks, establishing priority requirements for high-risk corridors such as those where commuter and intercity passenger railroads operate” (R-01-6).

This safety recommendation was reiterated to the FRA after a Burlington Northern Santa Fe freight train collided head-on with a Metrolink passenger train in Placentia, California in 2002. The probable cause of this accident was the freight train crew’s inattentiveness to the signal system. Contributing to this accident was the absence of a positive train control system that would have automatically stopped the freight train short of the stop signal and thus prevented the collision.

In the past 6 years, the NTSB has investigated 38 railroad accidents where Positive Train Control is a safety issue. Causal factors have often been attributed to train crew mistakes and failure to operate trains in accordance with operating rules. Human factor causes have included fatigue, sleep-apnea, use of medication, reduced visibility and distractions such as cell phone use.

Automatic train control systems are safety redundant systems that can override mistakes by human operators and prevent collision and over-speed accidents.

The FRA accident database for 2003 also attributes human factors as causal to most collision accidents. The 2003 data show that there were 146 head-on, rear-end and side collision accidents, and that 133 of those accidents, or 91 percent, are attributed to human factor causes.

The preliminary FRA accident database for 2004 also attributes human factors as causal to most collision accidents. The 2004 preliminary data shows 202 head-on, rear-end and side collision accidents (an increase of 56 accidents), and that 184 of those accidents, or 91 percent, are attributed to human factor causes.

NTSB is currently investigating 5 accidents involving freight train collisions. These accidents occurred in Washington State, New Mexico, Texas and Florida. As a result of a collision between 2 trains in Macdona, Texas, (near San Antonio), on June 28, 2004, a tank car filled with chlorine was breached, resulting in 3 fatalities and a significant public evacuation. On Wednesday, an NTSB Board of Inquiry into the cause of this accident completed the taking of testimony from 12 witnesses over 2 days. NTSB will examine whether Positive Train Control could have prevented the Macdona accident and another accident that occurred in Graniteville, South Carolina, on January 6, 2005. After the Graniteville accident, a switch on the main track was found in the open position to a siding. As a result of this accident, a tank car filled with chlorine was breached, resulting in 9 fatalities. Both of these accidents are still under investigation.

Progress on the implementation of Positive Train Control has been slow. This safety issue has been on the NTSB’s List of Most Wanted Transportation Safety Improvements since 1990. In 2003, the Senate Appropriations Committee noted that the pace of development and implementation of collision avoidance technologies was inadequate, and it criticized the lack of an industry-wide integration plan. (Report 107-224).

Notwithstanding the slow progress on Positive Train Control, the FRA has worked with railroads and suppliers to develop regulatory standards that address modern electronic systems and emerging technology in the signal and train control arena. The FRA issued a final rule to establish Standards for the Development and Use of Processor-Based Signal & Train Control Systems. The final rule should provide safety-critical standards that equipment must meet for use in PTC systems, but it will not provide interoperability standards that need to be addressed when equipment operated by different railroads is used on the same track.

Initiatives have been taken by some railroads to develop and install PTC systems. These include Amtrak, which has installed PTC on 436 miles of track that it owns on the Northeast Corridor and 45 miles of track on its Michigan Line; New Jersey Transit, which has installed PTC on 23 miles of its system and it expects to have PTC on all 540 miles of its system by the end of 2006; New Jersey Transit placed additional emphasis on this program following a head-on collision between 2 of its trains in 1996; and the Alaska Railroad, which operates both passenger and freight trains, is installing PTC on all 611 miles of its track. Alaska Railroad has now equipped all of its 62 locomotives. This project is funded, in part, by the FRA, and plans are to have PTC operational, system-wide, by the end of 2006.

Further, the FRA, the Association of American Railroads and the Illinois Department of Transportation are funding the North American Joint Positive Train Control Project over 120 miles of track on the St. Louis/Chicago corridor. A goal of this project is to help address equipment and operational issues that occur when different railroads use the same track.